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Abstract—It is of growing concern to ensure the resilience
in electricity infrastructure systems to extreme weather events
with the help of appropriate hardening measures and new
operational procedures. An effective mitigation strategy requires
a quantitative metric for resilience that can not only model the
impacts of the unseen catastrophic events for complex electric
power distribution networks but also evaluate the potential im-
provements offered by different planning measures. In this paper,
we propose probabilistic metrics to quantify the operational
resilience of the electric power distribution systems to high-
impact low-probability (HILP) events. Specifically, we define
two risk-based measures: Value-at-Risk (V aRα) and Conditional
Value-at-Risk (CV aRα) that measure resilience as the maximum
loss of energy and conditional expectation of a loss of energy,
respectively for the events beyond a prespecified risk threshold,
α. Next, we present a simulation-based framework to evaluate the
proposed resilience metrics for different weather scenarios with
the help of modified IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus system. The
simulation approach is also extended to evaluate the impacts of
different planning measures on the proposed resilience metrics.
Index Terms—Distribution system resilience, Resilience metric,
Value at Risk (VaR), Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)
I. INTRODUCTION
THE staggering cost of power system outages due tonatural disasters combined with the impacts on personal
safety and security from loss of critical services calls for an
urgent need to ensure resilience in complex electric power
networks [1], [2]. The need for resilience is particularly critical
for the aging power distribution grids, which are responsible
for an estimated 90% of the outages. This calls for a proac-
tive disruption-management paradigm for power distribution
systems beyond the classical reliability-oriented view that is
driven by high-impact low-probability (HILP) events rather
than persistent costs [3]. Planning for resilience requires a
metric that can not only quantify the impacts of potential HILP
events on the grid but also help evaluate/compare different
planning alternatives for their contributions towards improving
the grid’s operational resilience.
The operational resilience of power distribution systems
is characterized as the system’s ability to respond to and
recover from an HILP event. Traditionally, the performance
of the power distribution system is measured using post-event
reliability metrics such as SAIDI, SAIFI, MAIFI that provide
an evidence-based performance indication on how well a spe-
cific distribution grid responded to the normal chance failure
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events/outages. Unlike routine outages, adequately anticipating
and responding to HILP events is inherently difficult as they
are rare. The impacts of HILP events cannot be properly quan-
tified using reliability metrics calling for further considerations
for beyond the classical reliability-oriented view [3].
In related literature, several methods have been proposed
to quantify the resilience of the power grid. Resilience and
robustness of the power system modeled as a complex network
are studied in [4]; however, there exist a few indicators to
compare the effectiveness of different proactive measures on
power grid resilience. Others quantify resilience based on: 1)
the availability of power resources to supply the interrupted
loads after an extreme event [5], 2) the ability of the system to
supply the critical loads with reduced resources [6], and 3) so-
cial welfare indicating a satisfaction level depending on power
and water availability for loads or customers [7]; however, they
do not specifically model the probabilistic nature of HILP
events. Furthermore, the proposed resilience metrics were
mostly dimensionless quantities making it difficult to associate
those to real-world consequences. Numerous optimization-
based restoration methods have also been proposed to quantify
the resilience based on the amount and duration of criti-
cal loads restored [8]–[12]. Some approaches emphasize on
resilience driven, adaptive restoration strategies [13], [14].
However, similar to [15], these methods are reactive, i.e. they
focus on responding to an event rather than the quantification
of resilience for possible future HILP events. Furthermore,
they are specific to a given system and are scenario dependent
and therefore, do not explicitly quantify expected system
performance under unseen HILP events. Resilience metrics
similar to reliability measures such as expected energy not
served (EENS) and loss of load expectation (LOLE) have
also been proposed [16], [17]; however, these methods mostly
provide a reliability-oriented view and do not specifically
model the impacts of HILP events. Similarly, authors in
[18] proposed a two-stage stochastic framework for analyzing
the resiliency of distribution networks during disasters. It is
validated that the smart grid facilities such as microgrids and
distributed energy resources improve the resilience and recov-
ery of the grid. However, they do not specifically characterize
the impacts of HILP events. Therefore, the metric cannot
be generalized to assess system performance for possible
future extreme events. A few authors developed resilience
metrics by measuring “reduced consequences from failures”
or “deviation of system performance” [19], [20]. However,
they do not explicitly model the system behavior during and
after an extreme event. A framework to measure and assess the
resilience of a distribution system based on customer benefits
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2is proposed in [21]. The approach, however, is based on the
concept of service availability in reliability theory and do not
explicitly model the impacts of extreme events.
While a significant body of literature exists in defining
and quantifying power systems resilience, no formal resilience
metric is universally accepted. The existing metrics pose one
or more limitations including: (1) they are post-event measures
and hence do not provide any indication on the potential
impacts of a future event; (2) they do not specifically measure
the impacts of HILP events on system operations and perfor-
mance loss; (3) they do not provide a generalized framework
to evaluate the impacts of potential planning measures on
improving system resilience. Along these lines, a few have
suggested using risk-based characterization for resilience [22].
For example, [23] proposed a method to assess the resilience of
critical infrastructure systems for risk-based resource planning.
A probabilistic approach to assess and evaluate the time-
dependent resilience for electric power transmission systems is
proposed [24]. Similarly, a framework to determine the system
parameters that lead to low risks of power systems failure is
proposed in [25]. However, there remains a critical gap in
the existing literature on power grid resilience quantification.
First, the existing literature does not include specific risk-
based metrics and a framework to evaluate the same for power
distribution systems. Second, there is little to no effort on
developing a detailed resilience quantification framework that
can help compare improvements in power distribution grid
resilience due to alternate planning measures.
With these considerations, we propose a framework to
evaluate the resilience of power distribution systems us-
ing risk-based quantitative measures: Value-at-risk (V aRα)
and conditional-value-at risk (CV aRα). Various optimization
problem using CV aRα, mainly dealing with unit commitment
and wind generation uncertainty have been studied in the past
[26], [27]. These metrics also have been extensively used
in risk-averse financial planning to manage the impacts of
low-probability high-risk financial investments. Similar con-
siderations apply when managing the impacts of HILP events
making these suitable metrics to quantify not only the potential
impacts but also for comparative evaluation of the potential
benefits offered by alternate planning investments. The specific
contributions of this paper are summarized below:
1) Resilience Metric: Risk-based resilience metrics are de-
fined to quantify the operational resilience of power dis-
tribution systems when impacted by extreme events. The
proposed metrics (1) provide an indication of the potential
impacts of a future HILP event; (2) measure the ex-
pected performance of the system during an extreme event;
(3) measure consequences of an event on power system
operation and delivery (in terms of MWh not served);
and (4) quantify the effectiveness of potential resilience
enhancement strategies and investments thereby, satisfying
all four recommended criteria for a grid resilience metric
as identified in several high-level roadmap studies related
to critical infrastructure resilience (for ex. [28]).
2) Comprehensive Simulation Framework for Resilience
Quantification: A framework based on Monte-Carlo simu-
lation study is proposed to evaluate the impacts of HILP
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Fig. 1. VaR and CVaR assessment for a probabilistic weather event. HILP
events identified as the top (1− α)% high impact disruptions.
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Fig. 2. Regional wind profile
events on distribution system performance and to quantify
the risks posed by such events on system’s resilience. The
proposed framework is extended to quantify the effects
of potential disruption-management solutions that a utility
can employ for improving system resilience. The resilience
is quantified using the proposed metrics by simulating
different levels of damages in power distribution systems
and the effects of different recovery mechanisms.
II. PROPOSED RESILIENCE METRICS: DEFINITIONS
The proposed resilience metrics are motivated from risk-
management literature that relates to quantifying the risks
involved with a given financial investment. To this regard,
V aRα and CV aRα are the two measures commonly used
in risk-management literature to evaluate the impacts of low
probability events that can potentially cause extreme losses
for traders [29]. V aRα measures the maximum probable loss,
while CV aRα measures the expected shortfall due to the
highest impact events beyond a prespecified risk threshold,
α (see Fig. 1). Since both metrics specifically quantify the
extreme loses due to low probability events, they make suitable
choices to quantify the operational resilience.
In this section, we define several terms required to calculate
the proposed resilience metrics for power distribution systems
when subjected to HILP events. The system resilience is
characterized based on the loss in system performance caused
by probabilistic disruption events. To calculate this, we require
a probabilistic model for the event and an approach to model
its impact on system’s performance loss function.
3A. Probabilistic Event and System Performance Loss
An event is characterized by two parameters - intensity of
the event, I , modeled as a random variable; and the probability
of its occurrence, p(I). For example, the event of a windfall
for three different regions (having extreme, high, and normal
wind profiles) is characterized in Fig. 2, where x-axis indicate
wind speed (intensity of the event) and y-axis correspond to its
probability. Fig. 2 represents the probability density function
(PDF) of wind speed for a specific geographical region.
The intensity of the event affects the failure probability of
the system components (poles or lines) which in turn affects
the system performance loss. A system performance curve
also known as resilience curve is typically used to model
the impacts of a specific disaster event on the distribution
system performance [24]. The system performance loss, U(I),
when impacted by a random event I is represented as a
non-linear function of loss of load, L(I), and total time
taken to recover the system back to an acceptable level of
performance, t(I) as defined in (1). Simply, U(I) is obtained
by calculating the area under the system performance curve
that measures the energy not served (MWh) in the aftermath
of an event. Note that U(I) can be improved by proactive
planning measures such as advanced restoration methods and
hardening of distribution lines [30]. These effects are modeled
by appropriately representing the system performance curve as
detailed in Section IV.
U(I) = f (L(I) t(I)) , in MWh (1)
B. Risk-based Resilience Metrics
We define two risk-based resilience metrics: V aRα and
CV aRα. V aRα calculates the maximum loss in resilience
expected over a given time period for a specified degree of
confidence, α. . Simply, V aRα refers to the lowest value,
ζ, such that with a probability α, the loss does not exceed
ζ. CV aRα measures the conditional expectation of the loss
greater than those associated with V aRα.
To quantify system resilience, first, we calculate the system
performance loss function, U(I), by randomly sampling events
from event pdf, p(I). The pdf for U(I) is obtained by associat-
ing the measured loss, U(I), with the probability of observing
such loss, i.e. p(I) (see Fig. 1). Let, I represents a random
variable corresponding to a weather event (e.g wind speed)
having p(I) probability of occurrence. Then, the probability
that the system loss, U(I), will not exceed a threshold ζ when
impacted by a random event I is given by (2).
ψ(ζ) =
∫
U(I)≤ζ
p(I)dI (2)
Here, ψ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
loss which determines the behavior of the system for a random
event I . By definition, V aRα, with respect to a specified
probability level α in (0, 1) is given by (3).
V aRα = min{ζ ∈ R : ψ(ζ) ≥ α} (3)
Next, CV aRα metric is computed based on system perfor-
mance loss caused by those probabilistic disruption events that
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Fig. 3. Component level impact assessment for an extreme event: (a) fragility
curve for a wind profile [24] and (b) prototype curve fit models for percentage
of equipment damaged as a function of wind speed [32].
cause the highest impacts [31]. The metric CV aRα defined in
(4) measures the expected system loss (MWh) due to the top
(1−α)% of highest impact events. It is worthwhile to mention
that the events having losses greater than given level and losses
that do not achieve the prespecified level are a complete group
of events with probabilities α and 1− α respectively. Thus, a
CV aRα metric defined in (4) measures the resilience of the
system by calculating expected system performance loss due
to the disruption events conditioned on the events being HILP
(i.e. the tail of PDF for U(I) (See Fig. 1)).
CV aRα = (1− α)−1
∫
U(I)≥V aRα
U(I) p(I) dI. (4)
III. COMPONENT-LEVEL IMPACT MODEL
Resilience metrics proposed in Section II-B require PDF
for loss in system performance (U(I)) when impacted by a
weather event. The probability of a weather event, p(I), is
obtained using the PDF for the specified weather event for a
given region. For example, Fig. 2 shows PDF of regional wind
speed for three different regions observing extreme, high, and
normal wind speeds. The impact of a weather event on the
distribution system is used to evaluate system performance loss
function (U(I)). To do so, first, the probabilistic impact of a
weather event, in this case, wind-related event, is modeled at
the component-level. Next, a framework is developed to model
the system-level impact of the weather event.
A. Probabilistic Component-level Fragility Curve
In related literature, component-level fragility curves have
been used to model the impacts of hurricanes or other high-
wind events on power system components [33]. Specifically, a
fragility function maps the probability of failure of distribution
system components conditioned on the intensity of the hazard
(e.g., a wind speed). An example of the fragility curve is shown
in Fig. 3a, that relates the failure probability of distribution
system components to wind speed and is mathematically
expressed as the following:
Pl(ω) =

Pnl , if ω < ωcritical
Pl(ω), if ωcritical < ω < ωcollapse
1, if ω > ωcollapse
4where, Pl(ω) is the failure probability of a component as a
function of wind speed, ω; Pnl is the failure rate at normal
weather condition; ωcritical is the wind speed at which the
failure probability rapidly increases. The equipment has a
negligible probability of survival at ωcollapse.
The fragility curve can be generated using empirical data
gathered during disaster events. For example, in [32], pro-
totype curve-fit models for percentage damage in distribution
system components are constructed as a function of maximum
sustained wind speed using the recorded data on observed
damage within a given region (see Fig. 3b). The observed
damage from the past wind storms can yield estimates of
damage for a given wind profile. These damage estimates
can be coupled with infrastructure database and geographical
information system to construct an equivalent fragility curve
for the component. In this paper, the values of the fragility
curve are selected randomly for simulation purposes. How-
ever, empirical data, if available, can be used to adjust the
parameters.
B. Generate Component Damage Scenarios
The event-dependent failure probability of the distribution
system components, Pl(ω), is used to identify the opera-
tional states of individual distribution system components.
Corresponding to each component, c, a uniformly distributed
random number, rk ∼ U(0, 1), is generated. These random
numbers are compared with the event-dependent failure prob-
ability Pl(ω) for the given wind speed, ω, to obtain the
operational status of the component, F cl (ω), using (5).
F cl (ω) =
{
0, if Pl(ω) < rk
1, if Pl(ω) > rk
(5)
where, F cl is the failure function of c
th component where
F cl (ω) = 1 implies failure and vice-versa. The wind-affected
operational states for all distribution system components is
obtained. The component-level damage is used to calculate
system-level impacts and consequently the system loss func-
tion as detailed in the following section.
IV. SYSTEM-LEVEL IMPACT MODEL
This section details the approach to model the impact of a
weather event on the distribution system.
A. System Performance Curve/Resilience Curve
A simplified resilience curve demonstrating different phases
in which the power distribution system resides in the aftermath
of an extreme event and their time progression is shown in
Fig. 4 [24]. These include event progress, post-event degraded
state, restorative state, and recovery. The different phases as
indicated in Fig. 4 are as following:
1) Phase I: Event progress (t ∈ [te, tpe]), duration of event.
2) Phase II: Post-event degraded state (t ∈ [tpe, tr]) following
the end of event progress and before any restoration begins.
Damage assessment is performed in this phase.
3) Phase III: Restorative state (t ∈ [tr, tir]), for automated
restoration prior to any infrastructure recovery.
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Fig. 4. Approximated resilience curve for an event. The different colored
lines correspond to effects of proactive planning: (1) Base network - does
not include any proactive planning measure for resilience improvement; (2)
Smart network - includes DGs to support intentional islanding during Phase
III; (3) Robust network - includes hardening of the distribution lines lowering
the probability of component damage.
4) Phase IV: Infrastructure recovery stage (t ∈ [tir, tpr]),
system returns to original state prior to disaster.
Since the focus is on operational resilience, infrastructure
recovery phase is not included in the simulation framework
for metric calculation. That is, system performance between
{te, tir} as represented in Phases I-III is used to character-
ize the operational resilience metric. However, infrastructure
recovery can be easily included in the framework if enough
information regarding the overall repair process is available.
The information required for including infrastructure recovery
stage includes the dispatch of crew members, the available
resources for system repair, and the overall system recovery
and repair process. The only change that is required would be
the addition of area under the curve between time intervals
tir and tpr when evaluating the system performance loss for
a particular event.
B. Quantify System Performance Loss, Ui(I)
System performance loss, Ui(I), measures energy not
served (MWh) in the aftermath of an event. It is a mul-
tidimensional concept that requires both system loss (Li)
and transition time between the phases/states. Therefore, the
operational resilience is greatly influenced by the response of
system during Phases I–III of the resilience curve.
1) Initial System Loss, Phase I (tpe−te): The initial impact
depends on the type of disruption. For example, when the
system is hit by an earthquake, there is a sharp decrease in
resilience. On the other hand, a wind-related event may take a
longer time to degrade the system as it progresses geograph-
ically. In the state of event progress, the service to loads is
interrupted and hence the loss function increases. If the time
and location of the extreme event can be predicted accurately,
preventive actions can be applied before the event hits the
system and help decrease Li(I). Also, added redundancy can
help reduce the system performance loss and/or reduce the
slope of resilience degradation (See Phase-I of Fig. 4).
52) Damage Assessment, Phase II (tr − tpe): Following the
event, the system enters the post-event degraded stage (tpe)
where the resilience of the system is significantly compro-
mised. At this stage, the system prepares for the restoration
where damage assessment is done and the available resources
and a healthy portion of network are identified with the help
of utility crew members, collective information from smart
meters, geographical information system. Damage assessment
is crucial for enhancing resilience as no restoration actions can
be initiated unless the systems’ degraded state is known. The
system remains in the post-degraded state until the damage
assessment is complete which is represented by Phase-II in
Fig. 4. Note that the duration for damage assessment can
be improved with the help of fault identification algorithms,
optimized crew dispatch, outage report from customers, and
aerial survey after any extreme condition.
In general, the time for damage assessment can be cal-
culated using historical information on prior disasters. In
this paper, for normal weather conditions, time for damage
assessment, DAtimen , is assumed to be 2 hours; DA
time for
other weather conditions is determined using (6).
DAtime =

DAtimen , if ω ≤ 20 m/s
n1 ×DAtimen , if 20 m/s < ω ≤ 40 m/s
n2 ×DAtimen , , if ω > 40 m/s
(6)
where, n1 ∼ Uc(3, 4) and n2 ∼ Uc(5, 6) are random num-
bers generated within the pre-specified range. However, the
accuracy of the simulation output can be improved using
accurate values of DAtime provided by the system operator
for different intensities of weather event.
3) Restoration and Active Islanding Scheme, Phase III
(tir − tr): Following the actions in post-event degraded
state, the system enters the restorative state where a proper
restoration strategy is determined and disconnected loads are
gradually restored with help of feeder reconfiguration, dis-
tributed generation (DGs) and other smart actions. It is a step-
wise process where several switching actions are performed for
the reconfiguration of the network. The presence of remote-
controlled switches (RCS) and automated intentional islanding
procedures using utility-owned DGs can help restore the
system’s critical loads prior to infrastructure recovery. This
can help improve distribution system performance during the
restorative state before the infrastructure recovery is initiated
(i.e., from tr to tir). This is represented by Phase-III in the
resilience curve as shown in Fig. 4. It is understood that the
slope of a restorative state depends on the level of impact,
size of DGs available for active islanding, and the number
of switching schemes required for forming the DG supplied
islands.
4) Calculate System Performance Loss: Based on the afore-
mentioned discussion, the system performance loss, Ui(I)
when impacted by an event I is given by the area under
the resilience curve from te to tir. For example, for a smart
network, the performance loss is represented by the shaded
region in Fig. 4. The performance loss for three cases in Fig.
4 can be evaluated using (7a), (7b), and (7c) respectively.
U1(I) =
1
2
[
(tir − tpe) + (tir − te)
]
L1 (7a)
U2(I) =
1
2
(2tr − te − tpe)L2 + 1
2
(2L2 − Pres)(tir − tr)
(7b)
U3(I) =
1
2
[
(tir − tpe) + (tir − te)
]
L3 (7c)
where, i is the notation for particular scenario: (i = 1) base
network, (i = 2) smart network, (i = 3) robust network;
Pres is the amount of load restored by DGs for the restorative
state. It should be noted that the time from tr to tir is equal
to the time taken for performing the switching actions for
restoration based on active islanding scheme. It is assumed
that the switching scheme is sequential and the total switching
time (Ts) is the sum of switching times (8).
tir − tr = Ts =
∑
m∈Nsw
tms (8)
where, tms is the switching time for switch m; Nsw is the set
of switches involved in switching actions. The time to operate
a switch pair depends upon switch type. We assume mean time
to operate a manual switch and RCS to be 30 minutes and 20
seconds, respectively.
C. Model the Impacts of Proactive Planning
Several proactive planning measures can be applied to
enhancing the distribution system resilience. From an opera-
tional standpoint, a decision-maker can improve resilience by
allocating resources to lessen the average impact (Li), decrease
the damage assessment time (tr-tpe) to quickly enter the
restorative state and/or apply advanced restoration to decrease
Algorithm 1: Probabilistic loss for a given HILP event
1 Given: Weather data, Distribution system model
2 Step I: Fragility Modeling
3 Obtain PDF p(I) of the wind-speed profile for a given
geographical region using weather data
4 for each distribution lines do
5 Generate fragility curves
6 Obtain component failure probabilities Pl(ω)
7 Step II: Monte-Carlo Simulation
8 for each event in I do
9 Component level impact→ System level impact
10 Evaluate system loss for given event Ui(I)
11 if enough trials, then
12 Evaluate average loss function
13 else
14 Go to step 9
15 Step III: Probabilistic loss
16 Compute risk-based resilience metrics
17 Output: V aRα, CV aRα
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Fig. 5. From fragility modeling to probabilistic loss for resilience metric characterization. The steps for computing resilience metrics as outlined in Algorithm
1 are detailed here.
impact in restorative state (tir-tr). Two specific proactive
planning measures and approach to model their impact on
resilience curve are discussed in this section.
1) Robust Network–Hardening/Under-grounding: Harden-
ing the distribution lines, although expensive, is one of the
most effective methods to protect the system against extreme
wind storms. The hardening solutions mainly boost the in-
frastructure resilience thus reducing the initial system loss,
Li(I), as the event strikes and progresses. Several hardening
strategies include overhead structure reinforcement, vegetation
management, and undergrounding of distribution lines. By
hardening, components are made robust against the extreme
wind profile by reducing the probability of wind-induced
damages. In essence, hardening modifies the fragility curve
for the distribution system components (see Fig. 5). With
this planning measure, a decision-maker can expect to have
reduced loss, Li during the state of event progress as shown
by the green curve in Fig. 4.
2) Smart Network–Improved Response and Automated
Restoration: This is one of the smart solutions that aim
at enhancing the operational resilience by quickly restoring
the distribution system. Distribution circuit equipped with
enough smart meters and RCS allows for advanced automation
capabilities. In the presence of grid-forming DGs and RCSs,
intentional islands can be formed to supply critical loads prior
to infrastructure recovery as proposed in authors prior work
[10]. Besides, adequate situational awareness tools can enable
effective and timely decision making for damage assessment
and commencing appropriate actions for restoring the system’s
critical loads. This planning measure cannot help during the
phase of event progress and is not capable of reducing the
initial impact. However, it assists the system operator in quick
damage assessment and smart restoration of the system that
helps achieve the post-disturbance resilience by reducing the
duration of the degraded state. This effect is characterized by
the blue curve in Fig. 4, where area under the Phase III (tr, tir)
decreases due to restoration action.
V. MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION TO CHARACTERIZE
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM’S OPERATIONAL RESILIENCE
In this section, we detail the process for computing the re-
silience metric by evaluating the probabilistic system damage.
A. Probabilistic Function for System Performance Loss
In the proposed approach, the component level fragility
curves are used to generate system loss function. The overall
procedure introduced in Section III and IV is summarized
in Algorithm 1 and is detailed in Fig. 5. The framework
requires weather data and detailed system model as input
and it outputs the resilience metrics (V aRα & CV aRα).
Since weather intensity and its impact on equipment are not
deterministic, a Monte-Carlo simulation method, largely used
in bulk-system reliability calculation [34]–[36], is employed
to evaluate the probabilistic impacts of a weather event on
the distribution system. Although computationally intensive,
Monte Carlo simulations are suitable for the analysis and
planning purposes of complex systems as evident in related
prominent literature in this domain [27], [37], [38]. Further-
more, since the approach does not include any assumptions
regarding the probabilistic events, as often employed in related
analytical methods to reduce the complexity of probabilistic
computations, the approach is generalizable and relatively
more accurate. In this work, we aim at evaluating the resilience
of a distribution system for future extreme events that are
rare. Monte Carlo method enables simulation of such rare
events while including the low probability of observing those
to provide a realistic assessment of the risks associated with
such HILP events. The overall process to characterize the
distribution system’s operational resilience is discussed below:
1) Fragility Modeling: The fragility curve for each distri-
bution component, similar to one shown in Fig. 3, is generated
for a given weather event (in this case wind-related events).
7Note that fragility curves can be generated empirically, exper-
imentally or analytically using expert judgments as detailed
in Section III-A. The PDF for the concerning weather event
for the specified region is obtained using the meteorological
data collected using weather sensors; in this case probabilistic
wind-speed data (see Fig. 2). By mapping the regional wind
speed PDF (Fig. 2) to the component fragility curves (Fig.
3), the components’ failure probabilities (Pl(ω)) are obtained.
Recall that one of the proactive planning measures is hardening
of the distribution lines. Hardening of the distribution lines will
shift the fragility curve to the right thus making components
more robust to higher intensities of weather event (see Fig. 5).
Thus, when hardening is available, the failure probability of
the corresponding lines is changed.
2) Monte-Carlo Simulations: Monte-Carlo simulations are
used to generate damage scenarios for particular wind speed.
At each trial, the component-level failure probability, Pl(ω),
is used to determine the operational state of the particular
component, F cl (ω) using (5). Following a similar process,
operational states of all distribution system components are
obtained representing the damage scenario for a particular
Monte-Carlo trial. The generated damage scenario is then
used to evaluate the system loss function by generating the
resilience curve. The initial loss function is obtained using
distribution system simulator, OpenDSS. The effect of a smart
network (improved response and automated restoration) is
taken into consideration when evaluating the loss function if
such measures are available. To do so, the restoration scenarios
are embedded using the dedicated algorithms developed in
authors prior work [10]. Specifically, the restoration problem
is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to
maximize the load restored with the help of all available
feeder and DGs with intentional island formation [10]. After
implementing the smart actions, Phases I, II, and III of the
resilience curve are analyzed and loss function is calculated
using (7). Several trials of Monte-Carlo simulations are done
to obtain statistically representative results (See Fig. 5). The
process is repeated for multiple wind speeds. It should be
noted that if smart strategies are not available, it is assumed
that the system is restored only after the infrastructures are
recovered i.e. in Phase IV.
3) Probabilistic Loss: After a sufficient number of Monte-
Carlo simulations, average performance loss (in MWh) for
each sample of wind speed is obtained. The average loss is
then mapped onto the PDF for weather-event (wind speed)
to get a probabilistic representation for system performance
loss when subjected to a given weather event. At the end
of the Monte-Carlo simulations for all sampled intensities
of the weather event, i.e. wind speed, the PDF for loss
function is obtained as shown in Fig. 5. In this paper, loss in
energy (MWh) is used to measure the operational resilience
of distribution system subject to an extreme wind storm. The
framework can be applied to derive similar probabilistic loss
for other indices, for eg., loss of load, loss of critical load,
loss of life, etc.
B. Compute Risk-based Resilience Metric (CV aR and V aR)
The PDF representing for probabilistic loss function, Ui(I),
is used to compute V aRα and CV aRα metric using (3) and
(4). For a given confidence level α, CV aRα measures the
conditional expectation of observing a system loss (energy
loss in MWh) due to (1−α)% of highest impact events. The
expected loss as evaluated from CV aRα quantifies expected
loss in energy in MWh due to extreme wind-related events.
Note that the important distinction and novelty of the
proposed metric and simulation approach lies in its ability to
specifically model and quantify the effects of HILP events.
Therefore, although CV aRα quantifies MWh not served,
drawing a close analogy with EENS – a well-known reliability
index used for bulk-grid, the distinction lies in its ability to
specifically characterize the extreme events, unlike EENS that
quantifies unserved energy for expected contingencies.
Discussion on Applicability of the Proposed Simulation
Framework to Realistic Distribution System Models: The
proposed simulation framework can easily include any future
distribution system configurations such as those with battery
storage systems, photovoltaic generation (PVs), electric vehi-
cles (EVs), etc. and also detailed feeder models including ser-
vice transformers, secondary feeder, and individual customers
loads. The ability to generalize the simulation model emanates
from the use of OpenDSS to simulate distribution systems
operations. OpenDSS is a distribution system simulator that
is capable of analyzing a detailed electric power distribution
grid with distributed generation resources and new load models
such as EVs [39]. Similar considerations apply when incorpo-
rating detailed protection systems model/configuration includ-
ing mid-line reclosers, fuses, sectionalizers, etc. which may
help better isolate the faulted sections and enable restoring
additional loads on healthy but de-energized feeder sections.
In this study, we employ a simplified protection system model
for simulation studies. Essentially, it is assumed that each
faulted/damaged line can be isolated with the help of switches,
and the healthy but de-energized part of the feeder can then
be restored using available feeders and DGs. The simulation
framework, however, is applicable to any complex protection
systems model that can be simulated using OpenDSS.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus test systems are used
to demonstrate the proposed framework. The Monte Carlo
simulations are carried out on a PC with 3.4 GHz CPU and
16 GB RAM. The restoration problem for each scenario is
formulated as an MILP that can be solved using any off-the-
shelf MILP solvers. We have used MATLAB R2016a to build
the MILP model that is linked to the CPLEX 12.6 solver.
On an average for a scenario, it takes about 2 seconds to
solve the restoration problem for IEEE 123-bus and less than a
second for IEEE 37-bus test case. The following assumptions
are made for simulation purposes:
1) For the base case, we use same fragility curves for all dis-
tribution components assuming it spans a small geographic
area and observes a homogeneous weather condition.
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Fig. 6. Modified test cases with DGs and tie switches: (a) IEEE 37-bus, (b) IEEE 123-bus
2) It is assumed that no recovery/restoration is performed
during the event progress (to to te) and all the components
are online before the event.
3) To model proactive disruption-management solutions for
smart network, two tie switches, 54-94 and 151-300, are
added to simulate different restoration scenarios and line
93-94 is upgraded to a three-phase line in IEEE 123-bus
test case. Similarly, for IEEE 37-bus test case, six tie
switches are added for creating restoration scenarios. In
addition to new switches, utility-owned DGs with grid-
forming inverters are used to assist with the restoration
process via intentional islanding in both test cases (see Fig.
6).
4) To model proactive disruption-management solutions for
robust network, 15 overhead lines are randomly selected
and hardened for IEEE 37-bus whereas for IEEE 123-bus
16 different lines are hardened (see Fig. 6). This shifts the
fragility curve for the hardened lines to the right (see Fig.
5).
5) With high likelihood, a suitable protection system for
dynamically formed islands supplied by DG will not be
available due to damages and incorrect protection settings.
Thus, it is assumed that the existing protection system
is disabled when implementing advanced restoration de-
cisions by forming self-sustained islands using distributed
generators and tie switches.
A. Parameters and Environment Setup
First, several Monte-Carlo simulations are done to obtain
the required number of trials for the convergence of system
loss function for a given damage scenario. It is observed from
Fig. 7 that for both of the cases, 1000 trials are enough for
the convergence.
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Fig. 7. Convergence of Monte-Carlo simulations for different scenarios in:
(a) IEEE 123-bus and (b) IEEE 37-bus. It is observed that the convergence
is guaranteed after 1000 trials in both test cases for different scenarios.
The simulation steps are detailed here. First, we sample
a wind speed from the PDF for wind speed profile (Fig. 2)
and obtain the failure probabilities for the distribution lines.
We perform 1000 trials of Monte-Carlo simulations for the
sampled wind speed. For each trial, a loss function is obtained
by evaluating the phases of resilience curve as detailed in
Section V. For a smart network with automated restoration,
an optimization algorithm as detailed in [10] is employed to
assist with optimal island formation. Finally, the loss functions
calculated for the 1000 Monte-Carlo runs are averaged. The
process is repeated by sampling multiple wind speed values
from the PDF for the wind speed profile. This helps model
the system response for the different intensities of weather
event (Fig. 2). It is worth mentioning here that the duration
of Phase-I is known and assumed to be 2 hours in this work,
while the duration of Phase-II and Phase-III is provided by
the simulation framework (see Section V). A risk-threshold of
α = 0.95 is selected for all simulations.
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B. Evaluating Wind Speed Impacts on Operational Resilience
In this section, we evaluate the resilience indicators in
different phases of resilience curve for the three systems
detailed in Section IV-B: base, robust and smart. A particular
scenario of wind speed, ω = 25 m/s is considered for the
simulations. Fig. 8 shows the numeric values for three different
phases of resilience curve under study and loss function based
on the computed numeric values of each phase. It can be
observed for both test cases that making a few distribution
lines robust reduces the failure probability of lines during a
high-speed wind event thus decreasing the load loss (kW) in
Phase-I. Also, it is observed that making the network smarter
by improving the response and enabling active islanding based
restoration strategies results in a lower duration of post-event
degraded state. For example, for a given damage scenario,
the smart network takes 9.97 hours for damage assessment
whereas the base network takes around 12.436 hours (See
Phase-II of Fig. 8). Similarly, for the smart network, the
restoration algorithm helps to restore loads using utility-owned
DGs whereas the base network and robust network do not offer
any restoration options in Phase-III of the resilience curve.
A total of 325.13 kW and 312.22 kW load is restored in
IEEE 123 and IEEE 37-bus systems respectively by suitable
islanding scheme for the simulated scenario.
TABLE I
VAR AND CVAR FOR DIFFERENT WEATHER SCENARIOS FOR IEEE
123-BUS WITH α = 95%
S.No Weather Profile V aRα (MWh) CV aRα(MWh)
1 Extreme 61.10 68.22
2 High 15.27 16.85
3 Normal 2.44 2.72
C. Resilience Metric Computation: V aRα and CV aRα
1) Base Network: In this case, a base case network is
assumed without any hardened lines or advanced restoration
options using DGs. The loss function for each possible damage
scenario in a particular region, i.e. a regional wind profile
is obtained and plotted as a PDF (See black x-axes in Figs.
9 and 10). The vertical dashed line in the figure represents
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Fig. 9. System performance loss function (MWh) for IEEE 37-bus test case
during extreme wind profile for base, smart, and robust network.
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Fig. 10. System performance loss function (MWh) for IEEE 123-bus test
case during extreme wind profile for base, smart, and robust network.
the V aRα which forms a baseline for evaluation of expected
resilience loss in HILP event. Table I reports the V aRα and
CV aRα for the three wind profiles in Fig. 2. It is observed
that the expected resilience loss (MWh) beyond a threshold,
characterized by CV aRα, is higher for an extreme wind
profile and lower for normal wind profile. This illustrates that
the proposed approach can effectively quantify the resilience
for weather events specific to a given geographical area. Note
that while evaluating the resilience metric for the test cases,
we only consider extreme wind profile.
2) Proactive Planning Measures: In this case, two different
planning measures are implemented for both test feeder and
resilience improvement is analyzed for the systems when
impacted by the wind event corresponding to extreme weather
profile. First, the distribution networks under study are as-
sumed to have improved response and smart restoration actions
with DGs and tie switches (see Fig. 6). That is, for any damage
scenario, the system recovers with smart restoration actions
using algorithm detailed in [10]. This planning measure helps
to enhance resilience by modifying Phase-II and Phase-III of
the resilience curve. The loss function for each wind speed
is calculated using Monte-Carlo simulations and mapped into
10
TABLE II
VAR AND CVAR FOR DIFFERENT CASES WITH α = 95%
Test case: IEEE 123-bus
S.No Network V aRα(MWh) CV aRα(MWh)
1 Base Network 61.10 68.22
2 Smart Network 52.53 56.73
3 Robust Network 50.25 57.52
Test case: IEEE 37-bus
S.No Network V aRα(MWh) CV aRα(MWh)
1 Base Network 67.89 101.09
2 Smart Network 44.63 63.23
3 Robust Network 34.97 64.61
the PDF of wind intensity. The system loss is plotted as x-axis
(in red) in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10.
In the second case, the distribution network is made robust
via reinforcing/hardening a few distribution lines as previously
discussed. For this case, the loss function is computed and
mapped into PDF as shown in the blue x-axis of Fig. 9 and
Fig. 10. Notice that in both cases, the black x-axis represents
the probabilistic loss function for the base case.
Once the PDF for system loss is generated, α = 0.95 is used
to capture the HILP events or the extreme cases of regional
wind profile. V aRα and CV aRα are calculated as shown in
Table II. Note that the numerical values in the table report the
maximum (V aRα) and expected loss (CV aRα) of energy loss
(in MWh) due to (1−α)% of highest impact events. It can be
observed that for both test cases, V aRα and CV aRα values
are reduced for the network with an improved restoration
plan and the network with added reinforcement measures. The
proposed metric, therefore, quantifies the operational resilience
of a power distribution network and can be used as an
effective tool for comparing different strategies for boosting
grid resilience.
TABLE III
VAR AND CVAR FOR IEEE 123-BUS WITH DIFFERENT DG LOCATION
Network DG-{250, 450, 95} DG-{250, 450, 48}
V aRα CV aRα V aRα CV aRα
Smart Network 52.53 56.73 41.39 52.13
D. Discussions on Effect of DG Location
In this work, we have randomly placed DGs in the distri-
bution grid to evaluate the proposed framework in computing
the proposed resilience metrics. To study the effect of DG
location, we have changed the location of one of the DGs in
IEEE 123-bus network from bus 95 to bus 48. The results
are summarized in Table III. It is observed that the change in
DG location results in a new value for resilience metric. This
is because, with the change in DG location, a different DG
supplied island is formed to pick loads during the restoration
in the aftermath of an event. Therefore, the location of DG is
crucial towards the overall resilience of the system and should
be optimized.
The primary objective of this work is to propose risk-
based metrics and to demonstrate their use in quantifying
system resilience during HILP events and under different
resource allocations for resilience improvement. Therefore, in
this work, we do not optimize the DG location or size but
simply demonstrate how the metric can be used to evaluate the
operational resilience for any possible system configuration by
randomly locating and sizing the DGs. The problem of optimal
resource allocation to improve resilience is an important
direction for future research.
E. Discussions on Proposed Metric and Planning Measures
The resources allocated for resilience enhancement can
either lessen the impacts of an extreme event or improve
the system recovery time. Minimizing the expected resilience
loss requires an optimal allocation of planning resources that
help simultaneously reduce both the system loses and recovery
time. Although in this paper, we do not assess the associated
costs of the investment decisions (smart vs. robust network),
it is well understood that hardening measures are significantly
more expensive than smart grid investments. However, smart
operational measures alone are not enough to keep the lights
on during an extreme event [3]. Furthermore, it can be ob-
served in Fig. 11 that for different event intensities, the optimal
system response alternates between implementing smart ac-
tions and employing infrastructure hardening solutions. Since
weather events and their component-level impacts are rather
stochastic, having an optimal planning measure including both
smart actions and hardening can provide the most suitable
road-map for improving the resilience.
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The proposed metrics (CV aR and V aR) can be employed
to optimally allocate resources for different planning activities
to enhance the grid’s operational resilience. Specifically, the
proposed metric will be used to plan for the resources that
will improve the system performance during HILP events.
This requires a mechanism to quantify the improvements
in risks associated with the highest impact events under a
given resource allocation. The proposed resilience metrics
specifically model and quantify these aspects making them
suitable for resource planning for resilience. Towards this goal,
we envision a risk-averse framework for resource planning
to manage disruptions in the power distribution grid and to
inform on the optimal planning decisions.
Specifically, the planning problem for resilience can be
modeled as conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) optimization
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problem, a method widely used for risk-averse financial plan-
ning [40]–[42] which is apt when HILP events are a primary
concern. The main idea is to optimize a CV aR metric, which
measures the risks associated with loss of resilience when the
system under study is subjected to a percentage of highest-
impact events. This is achieved by developing functional
dependence between the event’s impacts and system loss and
recovery functions under specified resource allocations. For
example, the decision from such planning problem can help
identify the potential locations of distributed generators and
potential lines to upgrade that will minimize the disruptions to
system’s critical loads during a future extreme event. Since the
planning is based on the system’s response to HILP events, the
resulting upgraded grid will ensure that the supply to critical
loads is more resistant to disasters.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents probabilistic metrics and a detailed
simulation approach to quantify the resilience of electric power
distribution systems. The expected resilience loss due to HILP
events is characterized using two risk-based metrics: V aRα
and CV aRα. By definition, these metrics quantify the worst
outcomes of low probability highest impact events such as an
extreme weather event making them suitable for measuring
operation resilience of power distribution grid. We also detail
an approach to quantify the effects of smart operational
measures and infrastructure hardening solutions on improving
the distribution system resilience. From simulation studies,
it is observed that the proposed resilience metrics are well-
suited to compare different resilience enhancement strategies.
Finally, we conclude with an observation that a hybrid network
(stronger and smarter) might offer better resilience while
optimizing the investment costs for the possible resilience
enhancement measures.
A potential direction for future research is the use of
proposed operational resilience metrics in optimally allocat-
ing planning resources to improve the system’s performance
during HILP events. Specifically, a risk-averse framework is
envisioned for resource planning to manage disruptions in the
power distribution grid, and to inform on the optimal planning
decisions.
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